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Do general amnesty programs lead to reductions in the crime rate among immigrants?
We answer this question by exploiting cross-sectional and time variation in the number
of immigrants legalized generated by the enactment of repeated amnesty programs be-
tween 1990 and 2005 in Italy. We address the potential endogeneity of the “legalization
treatment” by instrumenting the actual number of legalized immigrants with alternative
predicted measures based on past amnesty applications patterns and residential choices
of documented and undocumented immigrants. We find that, in the year following an
amnesty, regions in which a higher share of immigrants obtained legal status experienced
a greater decline in non-EU immigrant crime rates, relative to other regions. The effect is
statistically significant but relatively small and not persistent. In further results, we fail
to find any evidence of substitution in the criminal market from other population groups
- namely, EU immigrants and Italian citizens - and we observe a small and not persistent
reduction in total offenses.
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1 Introduction
Native residents in receiving countries generally perceive undocumented immigrants as a par-
ticularly unsettling presence. Data from recent waves of the Transatlantic Trends Survey on
Immigration reported in Figure 1 show how attitudes of respondents in selected OECD coun-
tries vary when they consider undocumented (on the vertical axis) rather than documented
immigrants (on the horizontal axis). The graph in panel A shows that the share of respondents
concerned about undocumented immigrants is well above 50 percent in all countries and sub-
stantially larger than the share concerned about documented immigrants. Italy, the country
we study in this paper, has the largest percentage of interviewees that are concerned about
unauthorized immigrants (86 percent) while only 27 percent of Italian respondents report con-
cern about legal foreign residents. The graph in panel B shows that in countries such as Italy,
Spain and the US - where a large presence of unauthorized immigrants is a well documented
fact - the vast majority of respondents believe that their foreign born population is predomi-
nantly undocumented. Further, Panel C shows that in all countries, the fraction of respondents
reporting that undocumented immigrants are a burden on social services is larger than those
casting such blame on documented immigrants. Similarly, panel D shows that the concern
about immigrants increasing crime rates in host societies is stronger for unauthorized residents
than for legal ones.
One of the reasons that may explain why undocumented immigrants are met with stronger
opposition among receiving societies is that their presence tends to be associated with law-
breaking behavior. Individuals who circumvented migration legislation rules, so the argument
goes, may be more prone to ignore legislation in general, including criminal law. As a matter
of fact, theoretical predictions on the relationship between legal status and criminal behav-
ior are ambiguous. Establishing whether legal status causally affects criminal choices is an
empirical challenge. Undocumented immigrants often have demographic characteristics - e.g.,
being younger, less educated, more likely to be male than their documented counterparts - that
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strongly increase their likelihood of being potential offenders. A simple comparison of immi-
grants with and without legal status is not informative of causal relationships unless one can
convincingly deal with endogenous selection into residence status.1 Existing causal evidence is
still limited but tend to suggest that newly legalized crimes have lower propensity to engage in
crime (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015; Pinotti, 2017).
The existence of crime reduction effects of legalization is relevant for the debate on policy in-
terventions to deal with unauthorized residents. Voters’ support for policies that offer pathways
to legalization for undocumented immigrants may be strengthened if similar interventions lead
to a sizeable and persistent drop in immigrant crime. Alternative types of programs, however,
may produce different effects, depending on factors such as the criteria imposed for granting
legal status, the type and size of migrant groups affected or the entitlements associated to legal
status. General amnesties are a prominent example of these policies, having been adopted in
several host countries in recent years (Casarico et al., forthcoming). As the current migra-
tion policy debate in the US highlights, amnesties generally spark an intense political debate.
Whereas proponents emphasize the economic benefits stemming from offering legal status to
unauthorized residents, opponents often fear a recall effect on new-comers and generally dislike
the idea of openly rewarding law-breaking behaviour. We still know very little on the effects
of general amnesties on immigrant crime.2 If amnesties are effective in reducing criminal be-
haviour among immigrants, this may provide an additional argument for policy makers that
support them.3
In our paper, we analyze a context in which the undocumented population is large and
1Unobservable characteristics may increase both the probability of being undocumented and the propensity to
commit crime if, for instance, undocumented immigrants are more impatient or less risk averse than documented
immigrants.Dustmann et al. (2017) study the impact of legal status on the consumption behavior of immigrants
and find evidence compatible with less risk averse individuals sorting into illegal residence status.
2Evidence on the effect of alternative migration policy interventions on immigrant crime is also extremely
scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is the study by Miles and Cox (2014) on internal
enforcement against undocumented immigrants and crime rates in the US.
3A few papers have theoretically analyzed benefits and costs of amnesties, focusing in particular on the effects
on the labour market and public finances in receiving countries. See, among others: (Chau, 2001; Epstein and
Weiss, 2011; Casarico et al., forthcoming; Machado, 2017)
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persistent and where amnesty programs have been repeatedly and frequently enacted. In par-
ticular, we exploit four general amnesties, which granted legal status to large fractions of the
undocumented immigrant population in Italy, and we empirically investigate whether legal-
izations were followed by significant reductions in the crime rate among immigrants and how
persistent this effect was. Our identification strategy relies on both the geographical variation in
the number of immigrants legalized in different Italian regions and the time variation generated
by the repeated programs. We address the potential endogeneity of the “legalization treat-
ment” by instrumenting the actual number of legalized immigrants with alternative predicted
measures based on past residential choices of documented and undocumented immigrants and
on applications patterns in previous amnesties. We find that, in the year following an amnesty,
regions in which a higher share of immigrants obtained legal status experienced a greater decline
in immigrant crime rates, relative to other regions. The effect is statistically significant but
relatively small in magnitude and not persistent. In further results, we fail to find evidence of
substitution in the criminal market from other population groups (EU immigrants and Italian
citizens) whose residence status was not directly affected by amnesties. Moreover, we find that
the total number of offenses decreased more in areas that legalized a higher number of undocu-
mented immigrants, although the effect is small and not persistent. Our findings suggest that
although many other good arguments can be advanced to support amnesties for unauthorized
residents, their crime-reducing impact does not seem to be a compelling one.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize related literature
on immigration, legal status and crime. Section 3 describes the Italian institutional setting,
focusing on amnesties and on immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities. Section 4 offers
a discussion of our data and some descriptive statistics. Identification issues and our empirical
strategy are explained in section 5. Estimation results are presented in section 6. Finally, some
concluding remarks are made in section 7.
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2 Legal Status and Crime: Theory and Evidence
The empirical literature on the effects of legal status on immigrants’ outcomes in the labor
market generally finds increased wages and returns to skills for newly legalized immigrants.4 If
obtaining legal status improves immigrants’ economic integration, a standard economic model
of criminal decisions à la Becker (Becker, 1968) would predict a reduction in their propensity to
engage in crime. However, if a criminal conviction implies harsher penalties for undocumented
immigrants than for legal residents - e.g. being deported from the host country or being
permanently barred from applying for legal residence status in the future - legalizations may
produce the opposite effect.5 The impact of legal status on immigrants’ crime rate is therefore
theoretically ambiguous. A growing body of evidence has analyzed the relationship between
the presence of immigrants and crime rates in receiving societies.6 More recently, a few studies
have focused on the causal impact of changes in legal status on immigrants’ criminal decisions
by exploiting policies that created arguably exogenous variation in legal status. Using Italian
prison records, Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) rely on the 2007 European Union Enlargement
to compare recidivism rates of inmates from new EU member countries and candidate member
countries in a difference-in-differences approach. Pinotti (2017), instead, exploits the Italian
quota system using a regression discontinuity design and looks at successful and unsuccessful
applicant for residence and working permits. Both papers find a sizeable reduction in propensity
to engage in crime of newly legalized immigrants.
If individuals who become legal residents have lower incentives to engage in crime, one may
conclude that general amnesties that take a large fraction of the undocumented population “out
of the shadows” should potentially be effective policy instruments to reduce immigrant crime.
The validity of this conclusion, however, is subject to a few important caveats.
4See Fasani (2015) for a recent review of this literature.
5For instance, applicants for IRCA legalization were not admissible if they had previously been convicted of
a felony or of three or more misdemeanors (Kerwin, 2010).
6This literature has examined both the US (Butcher and Piehl, 1998a,b; Borjas et al., 2010; Chalfin, 2014;
Spenkuch, 2014) and European countries (Bianchi et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013; Nunziata, 2015; Piopiunik and
Ruhose, 2017), providing mixed evidence.
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First, the overall effect of an amnesty on immigrant crime will depend on the impact pro-
duced on all groups of migrants: those who were already legal residents, the legalized ones,
those who remained undocumented and the new arrivals. For instance, an amnesty may re-
duce the crime rate of those who are successfully legalized while increasing the propensity to
engage in crime of those who failed to become legal residents. Indeed, this latter group will
see its prospects of being legalized becoming increasingly uncertain and being delayed until
the next legalization opportunity (if any), with potentially adverse effects of the incentives to
commit crime. Moreover, legalization programs may be accompanied by general equilibrium
effects and/or by changes in enforcement policies that may induce a deterioration of the labour
market outcomes of immigrants who remain undocumented. In the US context, Freedman et al.
(forthcoming) find that Hispanic citizens - who were arguably still undocumented after the 1986
IRCA amnesty expired - offended significantly more. They rationalize their results with the
IRCA reform having introduced employment restrictions that made it more difficult for newly
arrived undocumented immigrants to find a job in the US.
A second important aspect to be considered is the presence of substitution effects in the
criminal market. If amnesties reduce the crime supply of a segment of the immigrant population
but leave the demand for crime unaffected, crime opportunities that are not taken by the newly
legalized immigrants may be seized by other groups of the migrant population and/or by native
offenders. Overall crime rates may thus remain unchanged even if legalized immigrants do less
crime.
Third, the size and duration of the crime-reducing effect of amnesties will also depend on
how effective legalizations are in reducing the presence of illegal residents in the country. While
legalizing (part of) the existing stock of undocumented residents, amnesties can at the same
time attract new unauthorized arrivals, potentially lured by the prospect of benefitting from
the current or a future amnesty. This “recall effect” may be particularly strong if the enactment
of the amnesty generates the expectation that other amnesties will be granted in the future.7
7As we will see in section 3.1, this should be a major concern in a context, such as the Italian one, in which
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If newly legalized immigrants are immediately replaced by unauthorized newcomers, the crime-
reducing effect of the amnesty may be zero even in the short run. In any case, the amnesty
effect will last only as long as new inflows do not reconstitute the initial stock of unauthorized
immigrants in the host country.
Our paper investigates how effective general amnesties are in reducing total immigrant
crime rates. The closest paper to ours is Baker (2015): he studies the impact of the 1986 IRCA
amnesty program on total (native and immigrant) crime and finds a significant crime-reduction
effect. We expand on his analysis in several directions. First, rather than a one-off amnesty
that offered a pathway to citizenship, we consider a setting in which repeated general amnesties
have been enacted within a limited span of time and have granted just a temporary resident
status to legalized immigrants. Second, we develop an instrumental variable strategy to deal
with the potential endogeneity of legalizations. Third, we separately analyze crime committed
by different groups of immigrants and by natives, allowing us to study potential substitution
effects in the criminal market. Fourth, we study a different OECD country in which the presence
of undocumented immigrants has been equally persistent and pervasive in recent years.
3 Institutional Setting
3.1 Migration Policy and Amnesties in Italy
Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of the foreign-born population in Italy between 1986 and
2012. The continuous line shows the stock of legal residents: it grew from fewer than 0.5 mil-
lion in 1990 to approximately 3.6 million individuals in 2012, that is, from less than 1 percent
to approximately 6 percent of the total resident population. General amnesties have been a
constant feature of the Italian migration policy. Between 1986 and 2012, seven legalization pro-
grams were enacted to grant legal status to the growing undocumented foreign-born population
amnesties are routinely enacted. In the US context, instead, Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) show that the 1986
IRCA did not increase nor decrease long-term patterns of the inflow of unauthorized immigrants.
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residing in Italy. The vertical bars in figure 2 report the number of immigrants legalized in each
amnesty (in thousands): 105 in 1986, 218 in 1990, 244 in 1995, 217 in 1998, 637 in 2002, 295 in
2009 and 135 in 2012. Amnesties were decided by the central government and simultaneously
implemented in all regions using nationally uniform procedures. They offered a temporary and
renewable residence and working permit to all undocumented immigrants who satisfied specific
criteria, generally based on a predetermined residence condition.8 The process of screening
the applications and releasing the residence permits was generally concluded within one or two
years from the closing date of the submission window. The acceptance rate of applications was
extremely high, being above 90 percent for all four amnesties that we analyze in this paper
(1990, 1995, 1998, 2002).
The dots in figure 2 correspond to estimates of the stock of unauthorized residents and
show a distinctive roller-coaster trend.9 According to these estimates, amnesties managed
to substantially reduce the stock of unauthorized residents in the short run, but failed to
stem new inflows of undocumented newcomers that rapidly re-created this population after
each amnesty.10 As a matter of fact, the frequent repetition of amnesties itself suggests that
undocumented immigrants kept arriving in the country after each of the legalization program.
Police records on border enforcement suggest that amnesties may have attracted larger inflows
of undocumented immigrants. The continuous line in Figure 3 reports the total annual number
of foreign citizens refused entry at the Italian border for being undocumented between 1989 and
2006 (vertical axis on the right). Although changes in this time series may be also driven by
changes in enforcement, entry refusals are an arguably good proxy of unauthorized migratory
8The amnesties in 1986 and 1995 simply asked the applicant to prove they had been in Italy at least since
the day before the amnesty law was passed. The amnesties in 1990 and 1998 required two and seven months of
minimum residence in Italy, respectively. The subsequent amnesties (2002, 2009 and 2012) conditioned eligibility
on both a residence and an employment condition. See Devillanova et al. (forthcoming).
9These estimates are produced in a systematic way and using a methodologically coherent approach by an
independent research foundation called ISMU (Fasani, 2009).
10The observable drop between 2006 and 2007 is due to an exceptional decision of the Italian government to
grant legal status to all applicants for the 2006 quota instead of rationing the working permits as the quota
system would imply. That choice corresponded to a de-facto amnesty for more than 300 thousand undocumented
workers (Fasani, 2009). Note that our empirical analysis focuses on the period 1991-2005 and it is therefore not
affected by this particular policy event.
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pressure on the borders. They shows a downward trend over time - from around 60 thousand
per year in the early ’90s to 20-30 thousand in the early ’00s - but also distinctive spikes in
correspondence of the four amnesties. Remarkably, yearly growth rates in people refused entry
at the border - reported by the bars in Figure 3 (vertical axis on the left) - are generally positive
only in the years the amnesties took place.
3.2 Immigrant Crime in Italy
Figure 4 reports the time series of four indicators of immigrants’ criminal involvement in Italy
over the period 1991-2005 (criminal charges, convictions, prison entries and prison population).
The distance between any of these continuous lines and the underlying dotted line - reporting
the share of documented immigrants over the total resident population - highlights a striking
over-representation of immigrants among criminal statistics at all stages of the Italian criminal
justice system. In 2005, the documented immigrant share in the total population reached
approximately 4 percent. In the same year, immigrants accounted for approximately 23 percent
of individuals receiving a criminal charge and for 22 percent of criminals convicted in Italian
tribunals.11 Figures are even higher in prison statistics: in 2005, 45 percent of the individuals
entering prison were immigrants, while they accounted for 33 percent of the prison population.
Overall, figure 4 suggests that a troubling large fraction of the immigrant population is involved
in crime in Italy. However, the fact that immigrants are often overrepresented among those
demographic groups - i.e., male, young, low-educated and poor individuals - who are more likely
to commit crime may contribute to inflating their criminal statistics. Moreover, one cannot rule
out the possibility that the criminal justice system is biased against immigrants in Italy.12
Official records show that a large share of the immigrants committing crime in Italy are
11Even if we account for the estimated stock of 540 thousand undocumented immigrants who were residing
in Italy in 2005, the total immigrant share would increase to 4.7 percent and immigrants would still be over-
represented among individuals receiving a criminal charge or a conviction by a factor of more than 4.
12We are not aware of any rigourous study of discrimination against immigrants in the Italian criminal justice
system. A closer examination of Italian prison statistics (ISTAT, 2006, 2012), however, suggests that factor
like language barriers, poor legal assistance and lack of a legal domicile all concur to the over-representation of
immigrants among the population behind bars in Italy.
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undocumented residents.13 This information is not collected in a systematic way and it is only
available for criminal charges, at the national level and for some years (see Barbagli and A.,
2011). In the period 2004-2009, the average share of illegal residents varies between 60 and 80
percent, depending on the type of offense: the highest average shares are in burglary (0.83), car
theft (0.82), theft (0.78) and robbery (0.77). This is a persistent phenomenon: figures recorded
in the mid-1990s were very similar to those of the late 2000s.
A country where immigrants largely contribute to criminal statistics and where undocu-
mented immigrants are responsible for the majority of these offenses provides an ideal setting
for analyzing whether mass legalizations are an effective policy instrument for reducing immi-
grants’ crime rates.14
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In our analysis, we use a panel of the twenty Italian administrative regions over fifteen years
(1991-2005) and analyze the empirical relationship between regional crime rates of foreign-born
citizens and the number of immigrants legalized in each region by one of the four amnesties
that were enacted over this period.
Immigrant crime. Our main measure of immigrant crime is based on yearly records from
the Italian Ministry of Justice on the number of individuals who received a criminal charge.
Data are consistently available for the period 1991-2005 and are disaggregated by the region
where the crime was committed and by the nationality of the (potential) offender. We use
these records to construct the main outcome variables for our empirical analysis: the number
of non-EU immigrants, EU immigrants and natives receiving a criminal charge. Unfortunately,
13Note that during the period we study, being an illegal resident was not a criminal offense in Italy but rather
an administrative infraction. Apprehensions of immigrants lacking legal status, therefore, are not counted in
criminal statistics.
14Bianchi et al. (2012) find no causal impact of the immigrant population on local crime rates. Although the
authors attempt to control for the presence of undocumented migrants in several ways, the inherent mismea-
surement of the distribution of this population across areas and of its movements over time may explain why
their estimates suggest that immigrants do not cause crime to rise.
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these data cannot be further disaggregated by type of crime or by gender and the series was
discontinued after year 2005. Criminal charges account for the subset of reported offences
for which the cases were cleared by the police, that is, crimes for which a potential offender
was identified and referred to the judical system to face prosecution. The identification of
potential offenders implies that their nationality is recorded, making criminal charges a very
informative indicator for studying the criminal behavior of immigrants. Statistics on reported
crime, instead, lack any demographic information about the offenders since they are often
unknown at the time the crime is reported to the police. While data on convictions and
detainees - that generally have information on the nationality of the criminals - share the
important drawbacks of capturing an even more selected subset of the criminal population and
of having a substantial lag with respect to the moment the offense was committed. In order to
develop an alternative measure of immigrant crime, we further gained access to yearly records
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the number of immigrants arrested by the Italian police
forces.15 These data can be disaggregated by region, are available for the period 1992-2001 and
do not distinguish between EU and non-EU immigrants. Finally, the Italian Ministry of Justice
data on criminal charges contain also information on the total number of offenses for which the
Italian criminal justice system has initiated prosecution proceedings. These data are available
with regional disaggregation and over the same period (1991-2005) as the dataset on individuals
charged. The offenses data are not linked to specific offenders and cannot thus be attributed to
immigrants rather than to natives. The information on the type of offense is also not available.
We use these records to construct a measure of total regional crime.
Panel A in Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for these variables. Over the period
we consider (1991-2005), there were 10.7 non-EU immigrants charged per ten thousand popula-
tion each year, with overall and within-region standard deviations of 9.2 and 6.3, respectively.
Non-EU immigrants accounted for 12 percent of the individuals receiving a criminal charge, EU
15Note that individuals arrested and individuals receiving a criminal charge are both subsets of the total pool
of offenders, but they only partially overlap: not all individuals being arrested are subsequently charged, and
not all those receiving a criminal charge are also arrested.
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immigrants for one percent (with approximately one individual charged every year per ten thou-
sand population), and the remaining 87 percent were Italian citizens. This latter population
group had an annual average of approximately 83 individuals charged per ten thousand popula-
tion. The average number of offenses was nearly 455 per ten thousand population, with overall
and within-region standard deviations of 173 and 84, respectively. Further, approximately 8.4
immigrants per ten thousand population were arrested over the period 1992-2001.
Legalizations. Over the period we consider (1991-2005), three general amnesties were
granted in Italy: in 1995, 1998 and 2002 (see section 3.1). In addition, an amnesty program was
implemented in 1990, and its effects on crime may still be present at the beginning of the period
we consider. Aggregate records on the total number of undocumented immigrants legalized in
each region by each of these four amnesties were obtained from the Italian Ministry of Internal
Affairs and used to construct our main independent variable. Panel B in Table 1 shows that
the average number of immigrants legalized by amnesties over the whole period analyzed is
approximately 12 individuals (per ten thousand population) with the overall and within-region
standard deviation both being close to 30. This variable, however, includes many zero values in
non-amnesty years. To obtain a better sense of the actual size of the “legalizations treatment”,
the table also reports descriptive statistics for the average number of legalizations computed
exclusively in amnesty years. The average figure increases to approximately 45 immigrants
legalized per ten thousand population, with a minimum value of 7.8 and a maximum of nearly
230.
Other regional controls. The other regional controls used in our analysis - resident popula-
tion, employment rate, GDP per capita and documented immigrant population - are provided
by the Italian Office of Statistics (ISTAT; www.istat.it). Over the period 1991-2005, the aver-
age region in our sample had a native population of 2.8 million people, a GDP per capita of
12.7 thousand euros (at constant 1990 euro-equivalent prices), an unemployment rate of 10.7
percent and approximately 185 documented immigrants per ten thousand native population




Our main measure of immigrant crime is the number of non-EU immigrants receiving a criminal
charge (FB ch), while the legalizations variable Art is the number of individuals legalized in
each region by one of the four amnesties enacted between 1990 and 2005. We normalize both
variables using the total native population residing in the region Poprt (in tens of thousands),
and we take logs.16 We regress changes in log regional migrant crime rate on the log of the
(normalized) number of legalized immigrants: this latter variable captures amnesty-induced











+ ∆X ′rtγ + ∆dt + ∆εrt (1)
where: Xrt is a set of time-varying regional controls; dt are year dummies; εrt is an error
term. Any regional fixed effect that may be potentially correlated with both dependent and
explanatory variables is removed by taking first-differences. The coefficient of interest β iden-
tifies the elasticity of immigrant crime rate to the “legalization treatment” (i.e. the number of
immigrants legalized). A negative coefficient would imply that regions where a higher number
of immigrants gained legal status experienced a larger decline in immigrant crime.
Equation (1) specifies a contemporaneous relation between immigrant crime and legalization
of undocumented immigrants. However, the timing and duration of this effect (if any) is an
empirical question. As a matter of fact, the effect does not have to be immediate. As discussed
in section 3.1, the applications processing time implied a sizeable lag between submission and
the obtainment of legal status. If the migrants’ incentives to engage in crime drop only once
they become legal residents, the crime-reducing impact of amnesties may be observed only after
16Because natives may react to inflows of immigrants by moving to a different region, throughout the analysis
we always use the first lag of the native population. Results do not significantly change if further lags or
contemporaneous population are used.
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some time. Further, the time elapsing between the date the crime is committed and the date
the criminal charge is filed may also generate a lag in the observed effect. In addition, the effect
may be more or less persistent. As we argue in section 2, its duration depends on how the
amnesty affects the criminal incentives of the different groups of the migrant population, their
relative size and their growth rates. In our regression analysis, we will investigate and discuss
the exact timing of the amnesty effect.
5.2 Econometric Issues
The elasticity of immigrant crime with respect to legalizations can be consistently estimated
only if the number of immigrants legalized in each region is exogenous in the regression equation
(1). Amnesties are enacted by the central government and simultaneously implemented in all
regions. While the decision to grant amnesties and the timing of these political decisions are
arguably orthogonal to immigrants’ endogenous residential choices and to local regional shocks,
the number of legalized individuals in each region may be correlated with both types of variables.
None of the amnesties we consider had a predetermined national or regional cap on the total
number of immigrants who could be legalized. The share of applicants who were granted legal
status was generally above 90 percent. The number of immigrants legalized in each region,
therefore, closely followed the number of applications submitted. Amnesty applications are
determined by the residential choices of undocumented immigrants and by their decisions to
participate in the program. Both types of choice are potentially endogenous in our regression.
For instance, undocumented immigrants will have greater incentive to settle in areas that offer
them better labor market opportunities and to apply in regions where returns to having legal
status are higher. Therefore, we could expect to observe more (less) applications in regions
with higher (lower) employment rates. Insofar as higher employment translates into lower
crime rates, a cross-sectional analysis would suggest that regions that receive higher numbers
of amnesty applications tend to experience lower levels of crime. Our empirical analysis is
13
robust to this identification threat because we remove any persistent regional difference by
first-differencing our data and exploiting within-region variation over time in legalizations and
crime. One may nevertheless be concerned that immigrants are (at least partially) able to
anticipate future shocks to the local economy and to modify their residential choices and/or
their participation in amnesties according to their predictions. For instance, if undocumented
immigrants who expect to observe an increase in employment in one region in the next period
are more likely to move there and to apply for legal status, and if a positive shock to employment
induces a reduction in crime, we could observe that a higher numbers of applications is filed
in regions experiencing larger reductions in crime rates. In this case, removing regional fixed
effects would not be sufficient to identify a causal parameter. In addition, one cannot rule
out the existence of other time-varying unobservable variables that correlate with both the
outcome and our main dependent variable and that could bias our estimate of the parameter
β. Unobservable changes in the strictness of regional police enforcement against undocumented
immigrants, for instance, may influence both their presence and their crime involvement in a
region.17
We address these concerns in two ways. First, we include time-varying regional controls to
capture the local economic cycle that is potentially correlated with both crime rates and the
number of applications. Second, we instrument the actual number of legalized immigrants with
alternative predicted measures based on past location choices of immigrants and past amnesty
application decisions of undocumented immigrants.18
Our main instrument predicts the number of legalizations in each region r in each amnesty
year t (Â81rt ) taking the total number of immigrants from each source country c legalized dur-
ing each amnesty (Act) and allocating them across regions according to the distribution of
17Potential (but minor) empirical issues regarding the other regional controls included in our regressions are
discussed in section A.2 in the Online Appendix.
18Our empirical strategy partially resembles the approach adopted by Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014).
They estimate the impact of changes in the prison population on crime and exploit repeated collective pardons
that generate exogenous variation in the number of detained criminals. While they can observe both the prison
population and the number of pardoned inmates (and can thus instrument the former variable with the latter),
we only observe the number of legalized immigrants and not the population of undocumented immigrants.
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cr ∗ Act for t = (1990, 1995, 1998, 2002) (2)
We define sh
81
cr as the ratio between the number of immigrants from country c residing in
region r in year 1981 (M81cr ) and the number of immigrants from country c residing in Italy in







The instrument has two components: a set of constant shares sh
81
cr , which generate cross-
sectional variation, and a national flow variable Act, which varies over time.
20 The exogeneity
of the instrument with respect to regional shocks is ensured by the fact that the first component
is predetermined with respect to the period analyzed (the census took place ten years before
the beginning of the period under study, namely 1991-2005) while the second component is
measured at the national level and should thus not reflect shocks occurring in any particular
Italian region. The instrument is valid under the identifying assumption that - conditional
on regional fixed effects - the shocks that occurred in year 1981 (and before) and determined
the distribution of immigrants of different nationalities across regions in that year are not
systematically correlated with those that determined the distribution of applications in the
amnesties granted in 1990, 1995, 1998 or 2002. This seems a reasonable assumption. Records
on the first twenty nationalities of immigrants legalized in each amnesty are available for all four
programs in the period we study. Data are reported in Online Appendix Table A 1. Countries
of origin like Morocco, Tunisia, Philippines, China and Senegal were consistently placed among
19Note that the census survey captures all immigrants who are residing in the country, including undocumented
immigrants, although the data do not allow to distinguish immigrants by their legal status.
20This instrument is conceptually similar to the supply-push component instrument proposed by Altonji and
Card (1991) and, since then, widely used in the migration literature. In studying the impact of immigrants
on local crime rates, for instance, this IV approach has been adopted by both Bianchi et al. (2012) for Italy
and Bell et al. (2013) for the UK. The instrument relies on a large body of evidence showing that settlement
patterns of previous waves of immigrants are strong predictors of residential choices of following waves (see,
among others, Bartel, 1989 and Munshi, 2003).
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the top national groups in all amnesties. Other nationalities, especially Eastern European ones,
appeared only in the mid-90s and quickly reached the top of the ranking. These data are used
to measure the time varying component Act of our instrument. The distribution of immigrants
in 1981 (sh
81
cr ) is measured with 1981 census data that are available at the regional level but
only for national groups of immigrants that were predominant at the time.21
In order to test the robustness of our estimates to the use of alternative instruments, we
develop two additional IV strategies. The first instrumental variable is constructed using in-
formation on a wider set of nationalities of immigrants who resided in Italy in 1990, while the
second is based on the geographical distribution of applications for an amnesty program that
was enacted in 1986. Both instruments are described in section A.1 in the Online Appendix.
An additional potential source of endogeneity that should be considered is measurement.
Using official administrative records for each amnesty program we should just have some un-
systematic measurement error in our independent variable. Indeed, mistakes in the recording
practices may lead to under- or over-counting of the actual number of legalized immigrants
in certain instances. This classical measurement error would generate attenuation bias in the
coefficient of interest but it would be effectively dealt with by using our proposed IV strategy.22
Two empirical issues regarding the outcome variable also deserve some discussion. First, a
possible disadvantage of using data on criminal charges (and arrests) is that observed changes
in crime may be driven by changes in the criminal justice systems treatment of immigrants
rather than by actual changes in their underlying criminal activity.23 Although we cannot
completely rule out this possibility, we do not see particular reasons for expecting systematic
changes in policing practices after the amnesties in Italy. In any case, these changes would
21Beyond EU-15 nationals, the main national groups residing in Italy in 1981 were (in decreasing order):
Tunisia, Jugoslavia, Iran, Libya, Venezuela, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Morocco,
Cape Verde, Somalia and Algeria.
22Measurement issues, instead, would potentially be far more complex if one wanted to use amnesty legaliza-
tions as a proxy for changes in the underlying undocumented population.
23Bohn et al. (2015) report some evidence in this direction for misdemeanors (but not for felonies) in one
American county in the aftermath of the IRCA.
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bias our results only if policing behavior changed differently across regions and in a way that
is systematically correlated with the number of immigrants legalized in each region. A second
issue to be considered is the role played by migrants’ reporting behavior. If immigrants’ decision
to report a crime is influenced by their residence status, we may expect amnesties to change
the number or reported offenses even if the underlying number of committed crimes does not
change.24
6 Results
6.1 OLS and IV Results
OLS estimates. In Table 2, we investigate whether legalizations are associated with lower im-
migrant crime and the exact timing and duration of this empirical relationship. Following our
estimating equation (1), we regress the yearly change in the log of non-EU immigrants charged
with a criminal offense (per ten thousand population) on the log of the number of individ-
uals legalized (per ten thousand population) in each amnesty.25 In all regressions, regional
fixed effects are removed by taking first-differences, a full set of year dummies is included to
capture national trends, and standard errors are clustered at the regional level to allow for
within-region serial correlation in local shocks.26 In columns 1-4 of Table 2, we alternatively
include the contemporaneous value of the “legalization treatment”, its first and second lags
and its first lead. The estimates reported in these columns show that while contemporaneous
legalizations do not result in lower immigrant crime (column 1), the first lag of the “legalization
24It is reasonable to expect undocumented immigrants to be more wary of interacting with the police than
documented immigrants. Gaining legal status should thus increase their incentives to report crimes, as found
by Comino et al. (2016) for the IRCA amnesty in the US. If this behavioral response is in place and is suf-
ficiently strong, it would potentially attenuate any crime-reduction effect of amnesties that we may observe.
Unfortunately, available data do not allow us to empirically asses this issue in our context.
25The number of immigrants legalized (Art) takes positive values in amnesty years and is equal to zero
otherwise. In order to have defined values when taking logs, we have added one to the number of applicants in
all years when constructing our main dependent variable: ln[(Art + 1)/Poprt].
26In Online Appendix Table A 2, we use wild cluster bootstrap to address the concern that twenty cluster
may be too few to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors. The level of significance of our estimates
is preserved. See section A.3 in the Online Appendix for further discussion.
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treatment” produces a significant negative effect (column 2): the estimated coefficient on this
latter variable is minus 0.03 and significant at the five percent level. The estimated coefficient
on the second lag of legalization is close to zero and not significant (column 3). Similarly, le-
galizations in period (t+1) do not produce any significant effect on current crime rates. In the
following columns (column 5-9), we gradually include all of the “legalization treatment” vari-
ables plus time-varying regional controls (log of total native population, log of GDP per capita,
unemployment rate, log of documented immigrant share). In all specifications, the estimated
coefficient on legalizations in (t-1) remains negative and statistically significant, while the coef-
ficients on the other legalization variables are closer to zero and not statistically different from
it. The estimates in Table 2 strongly suggest that regions where larger shares of immigrants
were legalized experienced relatively larger reductions in the number of immigrants receiving a
criminal charge. The crime-reducing effect is not contemporaneous, becoming significant only
one year after the amnesty took place. This finding is fully consistent both with the delays of
amnesty programs in actually granting legal status to the applicants and with criminal charges
measuring changes in committed offenses with some lag.27 The estimates in Table 2 further
imply that the effect is not persistent: two years after legalization, we fail to find any significant
effect on immigrant crime. A non-significant coefficient is also found on the first lead of the
“legalization treatment”. Note that while establishing the precise timing of the legalization
treatment after the amnesty is a purely empirical question, finding a significant effect (of any
sign) of legalizations on crime before the amnesty took place would be difficult to reconcile with
a causal interpretation of the relationship between legalizations and immigrant crime. Or, it
would point at the existence of anticipation effects.
In panel A of Table 3, we test the sensitivity of the estimated coefficient on legalizations
in period (t− 1) to the gradual inclusion of controls and of different national and local trends.
27Data on the average lag between the time a crime is committed and the moment the police files a criminal
charge against someone - or arrests a potential offender - are not available for the period we study. According to
a recent report of the Italian Office of National Statistics (ISTAT, 2017), however, the vast majority of criminal
charges (81%) filed by the Italian police in year 2014 referred to crimes committed in the same year.
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Beginning with a specification in which we condition only on year dummies (column 1), we
add regional controls in column 2 (log of total native population, log of GDP per capita,
unemployment rate) and the (log of the) documented immigrants share in column 3. We follow
the same pattern in columns 4-6, but we now include in the first-differenced equation dummies
for the four Italian macro-areas (North-West, North-East, Central, South) to allow for macro-
area linear trends. Finally, in columns 7-9, we allow for any trend at the macro-area level by
conditioning on a full set of interactions between year dummies and macro-area dummies. The
estimated coefficient on the “legalization treatment” in (t-1) oscillates around minus 0.03 and
is significant across all specifications.28 In Panel B of Table 3, we test whether our findings are
robust to the use of alternative measures of immigrant crime. In panel B1, the outcome is the
yearly change in the number of non-EU immigrants charged with a criminal offense normalized
by the total number of individuals receiving a criminal charge (rather than by the resident
native population). In panel B2, we use data on the number of immigrants arrested in each
region by the Italian police, normalized by the total native population. The coefficients reported
in panels B1 and B2 of Table 3 show that a negative and significant effect of legalizations on
immigrant crime (in the following period) is estimated with both measures.29
IV estimates. Our OLS estimates suggest that legalizations generate a statistically signifi-
cant crime reduction effect. As discussed in section 5.2, however, these estimates may be biased
by the potential endogeneity of the “legalization treatment”. In Table 4, we report IV estimates
- obtained using our main instrument (Â81rt ) - for the three alternative measures of immigrant
crime. Controls and trends are gradually included in the regressions following the same pattern
28In the Online Appendix Table A 3, we report OLS estimates for the other regional controls: we find positive
and significant coefficients on both the regional unemployment rate and documented immigrant share. The first
relationship suggests that worse economic conditions increase immigrants’ propensity to engage in crime, and this
is consistent with a standard criminal choice model à-la-Becker and with the fact that immigrants are generally
particularly exposed to economic downturns (Dustmann et al., 2010). The second coefficient mechanically
captures the fact that having more foreign-born residents leads to having more immigrants involved in crime.
Both coefficients identify economically sizeable effects.
29In unreported regressions, we test the timing of the legalizations effect on the number of immigrants arrested.
The pattern is remarkably similar to that observed for criminal charges and reported in table 2, whereby a
significant effect is estimated exclusively in the year after the amnesty took place.
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as in Table 3. In all specifications, the instrument is a strong predictor of the actual number
of immigrants legalized, with an F-statistic (IV: F-stat) that is well above the rule-of-thumb
value of ten for weak instruments. For our main measure of immigrant crime (Panel A), the
IV estimates of the coefficient on the number of legalizations at time t − 1 are all negative
and significantly different from zero. Notably, they are also very similar in magnitude to the
corresponding OLS estimates in Table 3. Indeed, we use a cluster-robust version of the Haus-
man test and find little evidence of endogeneity.30 IV results obtained using our alternative IV
strategies are shown in Panel A in the Online Appendix Table A 4: they are extremely similar
to those obtained using our main instrument. Further, panel B in Table 4 reports IV estimates
for the two alternative measures of immigrant crime: the share of non-EU immigrants receiving
a criminal charge over the total number of individuals charged (panel B1) and the number of
immigrants arrested per ten thousand native population (panel B2)). These IV estimates are
also very similar to the OLS estimates reported in panel B of Table 3.
Magnitude. Our estimates unambiguously confirm that legalizing undocumented immigrants
produces a crime-reducing effect in the year following the amnesty. The estimated coefficient on
the “legalization treatment” implies that a one-percent increase in the number of legalizations
(per ten thousand population) leads to an approximately 0.03 percent reduction in the ratio of
immigrants charged in year t over those charged in year t−1 . A more intuitive interpretation of
our results is obtained by taking our variables at their mean values and computing the impact
of legalizing, for instance, ten more immigrants per ten thousand population. According to
Table 1, increasing Art/Poprt by ten units corresponds to an approximately 80 percent increase
with respect to its mean value (12.1) and to a change equal to roughly one third of its within-
region standard deviation (28.8). In a region where immigrant crime is at its mean value (10.7
30The standard form of the Hausman test assumes homoscedasticity and no within-group serial correlation.
As we always cluster the standard errors by region, we implement a modified Hausman test that is robust to
clustering, as proposed in Wooldridge (2002). We include the predicted residuals from the first-stage regression
as an additional control in the main OLS equation and test whether the estimated coefficient on this variable
is significantly different from zero. See Cameron and Miller (2015) for details. In all columns, the p-values
reported in Panel A of Table 4 (IV: Hausman test: p-value) imply that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
the exogeneity of the “legalization treatment”.
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immigrants charged per ten thousand population; see Table 1), legalizing ten more immigrants
(per ten thousand population) would lead to having nearly 0.24 fewer immigrants charged with
criminal offenses (per ten thousand population). The average yearly change in the number of
immigrants charged in our sample is 1.2 (per ten thousand population): a region that legalized
ten more immigrants (per ten thousand population) would therefore experience a yearly change
in immigrant crime that is 20 percent smaller than the average change in our sample. The
effect is economically small although not completely negligible.
6.2 Further Results and Robustness Checks
Natives and EU immigrants. Table 5 reports OLS estimation results of the impact of amnesties
on criminal charges against Italian citizens (Panel A) and EU immigrants (Panel B). Over the
period we study, natives accounted for the largest share of individuals charged (87 percent) while
EU immigrants accounted for only one percent of them (see section 4). Regional controls and
dummies for alternative national and regional trends are gradually included in the specification.
As the residence status of Italian and EU citizens is not affected by amnesties, these two
population groups should not be directly affected by the legalization programs. This set of
estimates can thus be interpreted as a falsification exercise: we do not expect to find that regions
where a larger number of non-EU immigrants obtained legal status experienced a reduction in
crime committed by these other two population groups. Substitution effects in the criminal
market, however, may take place. If amnesties reduce the crime supply but leave crime demand
unaffected, the criminal opportunities that are no longer taken by the legalized immigrants
could be seized by other groups of potential offenders. The estimation results reported in Table
5 show no significant effect of legalizations on the number of individuals who received a criminal
charge among these two populations. The coefficients are all close to zero, and none of them
is significant. IV results - shown in the Online Appendix Table A 5 - fully support this set of
findings.
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Total offenses. If the reduction in non-EU immigrant crime was not matched by a change
of the opposite sign in the crime rate of EU immigrants and/or natives, we should expect to
observe a decline in overall crime rates. In Table 6, we test this conjecture by estimating the
impact of legalizations on total offenses rather than on the number of individuals receiving a
criminal charge. As with the previous outcomes, we normalize the number of offenses by total
native population (in tens of thousands) and we take logs. OLS (Panel A) and IV estimates
(Panel B) are reported in Table 6. All OLS coefficients are negative, although not significant.
The IV estimates are slightly larger in size and some of them - especially when year times
macro-area dummies are included - are significant or marginally significant.31 Although the
coefficients are imprecisely estimated, these estimates suggest an overall crime-reducing effect
of amnesties. As expected from the fact that the effect on immigrant crime is economically
small, the resulting effect on total offenses is also quite small in magnitude.32 In unreported
regressions, we find that the effect is also not persistent.
Heterogeneity across areas. Our findings can be rationalized with legalizations reducing
immigrants’ incentives to engage in crime by improving their labor market prospects. If this is
the mechanism at work, we should expect to observe a stronger effect of granting legal status in
areas that offer more opportunities of finding a job in the formal labor market. We investigate
this conjecture in Table 7. In the Italian context, North-West and North-east regions are
significantly richer, have lower unemployment rates and smaller underground economies than
Central and Southern regions.33 In columns 1-3, we interact the “legalization treatment” with
a dummy for the northern region and with a dummy for the central and southern regions.
31IV estimates are obtained using our main instrument Â81rt . Estimates from the alternative IV strategies are
reported in panel B of the Online Appendix Table A 4 and are remarkably similar to those in panel B of Table
6.
32The IV coefficient on the “legalization treatment” is approximately minus 0.01. According to this estimate,
a region that legalized ten more immigrants (per ten thousand population) - an increase roughly corresponding
to 80 percent of the mean value of the legalization variable - would experience a 1 percent reduction in total
offenses or 4.5 fewer offenses with respect to the mean value (that is 454.8; see Table 1).
33Over the period we analyze, the average GDP per capita was 16 thousand euros in the North-East, 15.7 in
the North-West, 13.7 in Central Italy and 9.2 in the South and Islands. The average unemployment rate was
4.5, 6.3, 7.7 and 17.5 percent, respectively. The estimated shares of shadow employment were 9, 10, 13 and 22
percent, respectively.
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In columns 4-6, we include interactions of legalizations with a dummy for each of the four
Italian macro-areas (North-East, North-West, Central and South). Our estimates suggest that
the crime reduction effect of legalization is indeed stronger in Northern regions. Similarly,
Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) find an effect of legal status on re-incarceration rates only in
the North of Italy.
Spatial Analysis. Our empirical analysis is based on relatively large geographical units.
Nevertheless, we may still worry that ignoring spatial lags or spatial dependence in the error
term may lead to biased estimates or reduced efficiency, respectively (LeSage and Pace, 2009).
In the Online Appendix Table A 6, we test for the presence of spatial autoregression or autocor-
relation across regions and check whether our estimates are affected by takings these empirical
aspects into consideration. Using alternative spatial weighting matrices, we estimate a Spatial
Autoregressive Model (SAR) and a Spatial Error Model (SEM). We find that the spatial terms
are generally not significant and that our estimates of the impact of legalizations on immigrant
crime are not affected by including spatial terms in the specification. These findings suggest
that spatial dependence is not relevant in our context. See section A.4 in the Online Appendix
for further discussion.
Type of offenses. The regional records on criminal charges we use in this analysis cannot be
further disaggregated by type of offense. Over the period we consider, national level data show
that immigrants are predominantly charged for property crimes (more than 75% of the total).
Existing evidence on crime and legal status - see Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) and Pinotti
(2017) for the Italian case - has consistently found that obtaining legal status reduce immigrants’
incentives to engage in economically motivated crime while leaving violent crime unaffected. We
replicate our empirical analysis using regional records on reported crime to the police. These
data can be disaggregated by major types of offence, although they contain no information
on potential offenders and, therefore, on their nationalities. In unreported regressions, we find
that legalizations of undocumented immigrants lead to a reduction in some types of crimes in
the year following the amnesty. In particular, we estimate a strongly significant reduction in
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robberies.34 In addition, we also find a marginally significant reduction in kidnap rate, a violent
crime that is generally economically motivated.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we test whether amnesty programs - that repeatedly granted legal status to large
shares of the undocumented immigrant population in Italy - led to significant reductions in
the immigrant crime rate. Our empirical analysis identifies a small and not persistent crime-
reducing effect of legalizations. When interpreting the magnitude of the effect we identify, one
must bear in mind that our main dependent variable is total (non-EU) immigrant crime: if
undocumented and/or documented immigrants increase their propensity to commit crime in
response to the reduction in criminal activities of newly legalized immigrants, we would find a
small effect of amnesties on aggregate immigrant crime even if the effect on those who obtained
legal status were substantial. Moreover, the arrival of new inflows of undocumented immigrants
may reduce the persistence and even nullify the potential crime-reducing impact of amnesty. In
the Italian context, where amnesties have been frequently and repeatedly adopted and where the
existing estimates of the undocumented immigrant stock in Italy suggest that this population
rapidly regenerated after each amnesty, this is undoubtedly an important explanation for our
findings.35
Our results suggest that, although there may be many other good reasons to grant legal
residence status to unauthorized residents, policy-makers can hardly use the argument that
mass legalizations produce an economically important crime-reducing effect. Rather than en-
acting one-off national programs, however, offering permanent opportunities for legalization
for individuals satisfying certain criteria may be more effective in achieving the desired reduc-
34Remarkably, this finding directly relates to the evidence provided by Bianchi et al (2012). They study
the relationship between immigration and crime in Italy over the period 1990-2003 and find that immigration
increases only the incidence of robberies, producing no significant effect on any other type of crime.
35The observed amnesty crime-reduction effect may be also attenuated by changes in immigrants’ crime
reporting behavior (if legalized immigrants have a higher propensity to report offenses). See section 5.2.
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tion in immigrant crime. Legalizations decided on an individual basis, indeed, may reduce the
propensity to engage in crime of legalized individuals without generating sudden inflows of new
unauthorized entrants. Moreover, individual legalizations do not generate the general equilib-
rium effects that a massive program implies and that may damage the economic prospects of
immigrants who fail to obtain legal status (inducing them to engage in more crime). The dis-
advantage of these permanent schemes, however, is creating the expectation among immigrants
that becoming a legal resident is possible for undocumented immigrants, potentially generating
more unauthorized entries and longer residence duration among undocumented immigrants.
Repeated and frequent amnesties have similar - and likely stronger - disadvantages and should
therefore be considered the least desirable policy option in this regard.
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Figure 1: Concern About Documented and Undocumented Immigrants in Selected
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Source: Transatlantic Trends - Immigration 2010, 2011 and 2013.















































































Note: the continuous line shows the stock of documented immigrants, as measured with the number of residence
permits (right vertical axis); the dots are estimates of the stock of undocumented immigrants produced by ISMU
(left vertical axis); the bars report the number of immigrants legalized in each amnesty program (left vertical
axis). Source: elaborations from ISTAT and ISMU data.
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Note: the continuous line reports the total annual number of foreign citizens refused entry at the Italian border
for being undocumented (right vertical axis); the bars report yearly growth rates in people refused entry at the
border (left vertical axis); the vertical lines identify the four amnesties (1990, 1995, 1998, 2002) that took place
in this period of time. Source: elaborations from data of the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs.
Figure 4: Share of Foreign Born Population at Different Stages of the Italian Crim-
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A Online Appendix - Further Empirical Issues
A.1 Alternative IV strategies
In order to test the robustness of our estimates to the use of alternative instruments, we develop
two additional IV strategies.
First, we construct an instrument - defined as Â90rt - replacing the immigrants shares mea-
sured in 1981 with the 1990 ones. Ministry of Internal Affairs’s records on residence permits
across Italian provinces for all nationalities of immigrants resident in Italy are available since
1990. Employing 1990 rather than 1981 data, therefore, we can improve our instrument by
using information on a wider set of nationalities. This improvement is especially important
for predicting legalizations in more recent amnesties. The overlap between predominant na-
tionalities in 1981 and top 20 countries of origin of legalized immigrants gradually shrinks over
time, because new nationalities started migrating to Italy while flows from some of the first
group of nationalities declined over time. This implies that our main instrument Â81rt is based
on a progressively smaller number of nationalities.36 The drawback of using data from 1990,
however, is that we should now worry about persistent shocks that may have influenced the
distribution of both the immigrants in 1990 and the legalizations in later years. This concern
is particularly salient for the first two amnesties we analyze. Here, we face a trade-off between
having better data and potentially threatening the validity of our IV strategy.
Second, we develop an instrumental variable strategy - defined as Â86rt - that is exclusively
based on the regional distribution of amnesty applications in the first legalization program that
took place in 1986. In particular, we use the number of immigrants legalized in each Italian
region with the 1986 amnesty as instrument for the legalizations granted in following amnesties.
From one amnesty to the other, local economic shocks should change the relative attractiveness
of regional labor markets for undocumented immigrants arriving in Italy and their incentives
36For instance, nine of the first twenty nationalities that were legalized with the 1990 amnesty were also
among the major national communities residing in Italy in 1981. The number drops to four countries in the
2002 amnesty.
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to apply for legal status. While this latter variation is potentially endogenous in our regres-
sions, the instrument we propose should isolate the component of exogenous variation that
can be predicted based on past residential and amnesty application choices of undocumented
immigrants. Our instrument is time invariant and we therefore interact it with amnesty year
dummies. These interaction terms allow legalizations in 1986 to differentially predict the “le-
galization treatment” in each of the following amnesties.37 As before, the instrument is valid
under the assumption that regional shocks are not too persistent.
A.2 Other Regional Controls
In our view, the other regional controls included in our regressions - i.e., resident population,
unemployment rate, GDP per capita, share of documented immigrants - do not pose particular
empirical issues. Nevertheless, throughout our empirical analysis, we will test the robustness
of our main results by first presenting unconditional estimates of the impact of legalizations on
immigrant crime and then by gradually adding regional controls. When conditioning on the
resident population, we exclusively use the native population and lag it once, as natives may
react to immigrant inflows by moving to other areas (although inter-regional migration is very
low in Italy). The first lag of the native population is also used to normalize both immigrant
crime and the “legalization“ treatment. Local economic controls (unemployment rate and GDP
per capita) are considered exogenous in our regression: as the number of individuals legalized
is small relative to the native population (its average value in amnesty years is approximately
45 individuals for every ten thousand native residents; see Table 1), we exclude an effect of the
“legalization treatment” on regional economic outcomes. 38 The inclusion of the share of docu-
mented immigrants, however, is potentially more problematic. Although the documented stock
shows independent variation with respect to the legalization programs - driven, for instance,
by new legal entries and by return migration - the number of immigrants legalized and the
37This approach is analogous to the main IV strategy adopted in Dustmann et al. (2013).
38All our findings are robust to using the first lag of regional unemployment rate and GDP per capita. Results
can be provided upon request.
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changes in the documented stock are highly and positively correlated in the years immediately
following an amnesty. Obviously, regions where larger numbers of immigrants obtain legal sta-
tus experience larger increases in the stock of documented immigrants. These amnesty-driven
mechanical increases in the documented immigrant population make us wary of conditioning
on this variable in our regressions, and we therefore include this control only in some of the
specifications. If both immigrant crime and the number of legalizations are positively correlated
with the stock of legal migrants, leaving the latter variable in the error term will potentially
generate an upward bias in our estimates of the impact of legalization on immigrant crime. As
this latter parameter is expected to be negative, we would therefore estimate a lower bound of
the effect of interest.
A.3 Clustering of standard errors
Throughout our empirical analysis, we cluster the standard errors at the regional level. While
allowing for intra-region serial correlation in shocks seems the most sensible approach to get
correct inference in our setting, one may worry that the small number of clusters (twenty) may
lead to a downward bias in estimating the standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004). As a matter
of fact, the asymptotic justification for inference with cluster-robust standard errors assumes
that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Although there is no recognized rule-of-thumb
to establish when the clusters are “too few”, twenty clusters may be close to that worrying
threshold (although the issue is less problematic when the panel is balanced, as it is in our case;
see Cameron and Miller, 2015). Cameron et al. (2008) recommend using the cluster-robust
(Huber-White) variance estimator but prescribe using bootstrap when there are few clusters.
In particular, they suggest using wild cluster bootstrap to improve finite-sample inference (see
Cameron and Miller, 2015, for a detailed discussion of this method). In Appendix Table A
2, we report again the OLS estimates of the “legalization treatment” shown in Panel A of
Table 3 (excluding those conditional on share of documented immigrants). We compare the
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p-values obtained by clustering the standard errors with those produced by implementing wild
cluster bootstrap (using an increasing number of bootstrapping repetitions: 500, 1000, 2000 and
5000).39 Remarkably, bootstrapped p-values are not systematically larger than those obtained
from “simple” clustering (actually, they tend to be smaller in four columns out of six) and the
level of significance of the estimates is identical for the two procedures in all cases. Overall,
estimates in Appendix Table A 2 suggest that in our setting having twenty clusters does not
affect the correctness of our inference.
A.4 Spatial Analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on the twenty administrative Italian regions (i.e. NUTS 2).
These are relatively large geographical units, since Italy as a whole has an area of more than 300
thousand km. Nevertheless, we may still worry that ignoring spatial lags or spatial dependence
in the error term may lead to biased estimates or reduced efficiency, respectively (LeSage and
Pace, 2009). In this section, we test for the presence of spatial autoregression or autocorrelation
across regions and check whether our estimates are affected by takings these empirical aspects
into consideration.
In order to carry out our spatial analysis, we start by constructing an inverse-distance matrix
for all twenty Italian regions. We use the geographical coordinates of each region capital city
to compute distances across regions. Since our study focuses on migration and crime – that are
both phenomena highly concentrated in urban centres – this choice seems preferable to using
region centroids. We use the haversine distance measure, as computed by the Stata spmat
command (see Drukker et al., 2013). The average distance between capitals of different Italian
regions is approximately 330 km. In order to exclude unreasonable spatial influences between
regions that are extremely far from each other, we truncate this matrix at three different
thresholds, constructing alternative spatial weighting matrices. In particular, we set equal to
39Wild cluster bootstrap p-values are obtained using the STATA command cgmwildboot, written by Judson
Caskey.
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zero the inverse distances of regions whose capitals are more than 330 km, 250 km and 150 km
apart. Obviously, the number of links (i.e. “neighbours”) defined by each weighting matrix
is increasing in the chosen threshold. When the maximum distance is set to 330 km, there is
only one region (Sardinia) without any link to other regions and there are two regions with 11
links. The maximum number of links decreases to 8 and to 4 when the maximum distance is
constrained to be below 250 and 150 km, respectively.
Appendix Table A 6 presents estimates obtained from our spatial analysis. We regress
changes in (the log of) criminal charges (per ten thousand native population) on the number
of immigrants legalized (per ten thousand population) in the previous year. We estimate two
spatial models with Quasi-Maximum Likelihood: a Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) in
panel A and a Spatial Error Model (SEM) in panel B.40 We denote with ρ the coefficient on
the spatial lag and with λ the coefficient for the spatial error. We use the alternative spatial
weighting matrices W obtained by giving weight zero to regions that are more than 330 km
(columns 1-3), 250 km (columns 4-6) and 150 km (columns 7-9) apart. Appendix Table A 6
shows that – irrespectively of the spatial weighting matrix used – the spatial terms are generally
not significant. Moreover, our estimates of the impact of legalizations on immigrant crime are
not affected by allowing for spatial lags and spatial correlation. These findings suggest that
spatial dependence is not relevant in our context.
40Both models are estimated using the Stata xsmle command (see Belotti et al., 2017).
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Â
8
6
r
t
ln
(I
m
m
L
e
g
a
li
z
e
d
/
N
a
t
P
o
p
)(
t-
1
)
-0
.0
28
**
-0
.0
2
9
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
1
3
]
[0
.0
1
3
]
[0
.0
1
0
]
[0
.0
1
1
]
[0
.0
1
0
]
[0
.0
1
0
]
[0
.0
1
1
]
[0
.0
1
2
]
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
T
o
ta
l
O
ff
e
n
c
e
s
P
a
n
e
l
B
1
:
Â
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